The existing theory of decoy-state quantum cryptography assumes the exact control of each states from Alice's source. Such exact control is impossible in practice. We develop the theory of decoy-state method so that it is unconditionally secure even there are state errors of sources, if the range of a few parameters in the states are known. This theory simplifies the practical implementation of the decoy-state quantum key distribution because the unconditional security can be achieved with a slightly shortened final key, even though the small errors of pulses are not corrected.
INTRODUCTION
Most of the existing set-ups of quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] use imperfect single-photon source. Such an implementation in principle suffers from the photon-numbersplitting attack [6, 7] . The decoy-state method [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] and some other methods [16, 17, 18] can be used for unconditionally secure QKD even Alice only uses an imperfect source [6, 7] .
The separate theoretical result of ILM-GLLP [5] shows that a secure final key can be distilled even though an imperfect source is used in the protocol, if one knows the lower bound of the fraction of those raw bits generated by single-photon pulses from Alice. The decoy-state method is to verify such a bound faithfully and efficiently. The ILM-GLLP theory does not need the exact value of the fraction of raw bits due to single-photon pulses from Alice. It only needs the lower bound of fraction of un-tagged bits. The goal of decoystate method is to verify such a lower bound through the observed experiment data.
Recently, a number of experiments on the decoy-state QKD have been done [19, 20] .
However, the existing decoy-state theory assumes the perfect control of the source states in the photon number space. This is an impossible task for any real set-up in practice.
A new problem arose in practice is how to carry out the decoy-state method securely and efficiently given the inexact control of the source. Even though one can control the pulse intensity pretty well in practice, we still need quantitative criteria on the effects of possible small errors in the source states. By currently existing technology, the source error can be polynomially small rather than exponentially small. One may argue sine the source error is very small, the error-free decoy-state theory must work. But we never know how small is sufficiently small so that the error can be securely regarded as 0. If we judge 20% of intensity error is too large, we have no reason to say 1% error is small enough for unconditional security with error-free decoy-state theory. There are also problems in evaluating the different setups. Suppose there are two set-ups, A and B, they can make QKD for the same distance.
Set-up A can have a key rate of 100 bits per second with possible intensity error of 3% while set-up B can have a key rate of 80 bits per second with possible intensity error of 1%, we don't know which one is better. To answer all these questions, we need a more general theory that directly applies to the case with state errors. If we have a stable two-value attenuator, we can use the method in Ref. [23] . If the parameter errors of states of each pulses are random and independent, we can apply the existing decoy-state method with the averaged-state [12, 22] .
Here we study the decoy-state method with state errors of Alice's source without any of the above presumed conditions. Our result here is not limited to the intensity error only, it applies to the more general case of state errors from the source. For example, in the protocol using coherent states, intensity error is only a special type of error which changes one parameter in the coherent state only, but the state is still a coherent state, i.e., a Possonian distribution with another parameter. Generally speaking, there could be certain types of sour errors with which the state is not a coherent state, i.e., not in the Possonian distribution. Our study shows that the decoy-state method is still secure even with state errors, but the key rate will be decreased. Our result only needs the range of a few parameters in the source states, regardless of whatever error pattern. In our method, we have assumed the worst case that Eavesdropper (Eve.) knows exactly the error of each pulse. Our result immediately applies to all existing experimental results. This paper is arranged as the following. After the introduction above, we review the main idea and basic assumptions of the existing error-free decoy-state theory. As a result, the most general condition and formula for the error-free decoy-state method are given. We then study the main problem of this paper: the decoy-state method with state errors from the source. After pointing out the consequence of the source errors, we present a general formula where only the bound values of a few parameters in the states are involved. The result is secure even in the case Eve. knows exactly the error of each pulse. We then point out that our theory can be applied in the practical set-ups with state errors, such as the decoy-state Plug-and-Play protocol raised by Gisin group [25] . The paper is ended with a concluding remark.
II. REVIEW OF THE EXISTING ERROR-FREE DECOY-STATE THEORY
We call the existing theory [8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15] error-free theory because it assumes no error for the source states in the photon-number space. Although most of the literatures [8, 9, 10, 11] study the error-free decoy-state method only with specific distributions of source states, the assumption of a specific distribution is actually not necessary. Basically, we only need a few conditions for the source states rather than the complete distribution function.
Here we summarize the existing theory in the extended format.
In the 3-intensity protocol, Alice has three sources, source Y 0 which can produce vacuum only, source Y which can only produce state
only, and source Y ′ which can only produce state
only, where |k is the k−photon Fock state and a k ≥ 0, a
Here J can be either finite or infinite. Given a coherent-state source or a heralded single-photon source from the parametric down conversion, J = ∞. When a coherent-state source [8, 9, 10, 11] or a heralded single-photon source [13, 14] is used, the parameters a k , a Y or Y ′ as a probabilistic photon-number source which sends out a k-photon pulse (photon number state |k ) with probability distribution {a k } or {a ′ k }. The task here is to verify the lower bound of the raw bits caused by those single-photon pulses from Alice. Alice and Bob can not directly observe the number of single-photon counts because they don't know which pulses at Alice's side are single-photon pulses. They only know which pulse belongs to which source and the states of each source. The decoy-state theory shows that they only need to know the number of counts due to the pulses from each sources in order to verify how many raw bits are generated from the single-photon pulses from Alice.
We first define the counting rate of a class (or a sub-class) of pulses. A class or a subclass can be any set or subset of pulses from Alice. In the 3-intensity decoy-state method, Alice has 3 sources. Here we shall regard each source as a class, and all those k-photon (k = 0, 1, 2, · · ·) pulses from the same source as a subclass. Given any class X that contains M X pulses, after Alice sends them out to Bob, if Bob observes n counts at his side, the counting rate for pulses in this class is
If class X is divided into J sub-classes and any pulse in class X belongs to and only belongs to one subclass and the fractions of pulses in each subclasses are b 0 , b 1 · · · , b J , then the counting rate of class X is
and s k is the counting rate of the kth subclass. This is simply because the total counts of a class equals to the summation of counts of each sub-classes, i.e.,
and n k is the number of counts at Bob's side caused by pulses in the kth sub-class from
Alice. We denote the counting rates of the decoy-source (class Y ), the signal source (class
, and the vacuum source (class Y 0 ) by S, S ′ , and S 0 , respectively. Since in the protocol, Alice knows which pulse is from which source, these S, S ′ , and S 0 can be observed directly in the experiment therefore we regard them as known parameters. Given the state of the decoy pulses in Eq.(1), the fraction of k−photon pulses is a k . Then we have
and s k is the counting rate of those k−photon pulses from source Y , and
Similarly, we also have
and s ′ k is the counting rate of those k−photon pulses from source Y ′ , S ′ is the counting rate of all pulses from source Y ′ .
Asymptotically, the counting rate of the sub-class of those k-photon pulses from the decoy source and the sub-class of those k-photon pulses from the signal source must be equal
if the pulses from these two subclasses are randomly mixed. According to this, we also have,
Here S 0 is the counting rate of class Y 0 . In the protocol Alice randomly uses three sources therefore those k-photon pulses from the decoy-source and those k-photon pulses from the signal source are randomly mixed. We can rewrite Eq. (8) in the format
Obviously,
Given Eq.(6,11), one can find the following fact
Since δ ≥ 0, and the second inequality in Eq. (14) is
The minimum value of the single-photon counting rate is now verified to be
The fractions of the single-photon counts for the signal source and the decoy source are
Given these, one can calculate the final key rate of each source, e.g., the final key rate for the signal source is by [5, 11] R s = ∆ ′ where t 1 , t are the QBER for single-photon pulses and the QBER for all signal pulses. This is the (extended) result of the decoy-state method with diagonal states in photon number space, including the coherent states, thermal states, heralded single-photon states, and so on with the condition that the source states are exactly controlled and Eq. (14) holds.
III. CONSEQUENCE OF SOURCE ERRORS:
However, the results above are based on the assumption that all states are produced exactly. Now we study the the consequence of the source errors in an actual protocol.
A very tricky point here is that Eq. (9) is in general incorrect, if there are state errors. We emphasize that this issue was first pointed out by us in a number of places. For example, in the shorter version of our work [24] (in the text around Eq. (11) there), and also in section 4.3.5 of Ref. [8] . In all these places we have clearly stated the issue. Here we present the main idea about this point and also the reason behind:
Eq. (9) is the most important element of the error-free decoy-state theory. Now we explain why we don't use Eq. (9) here if we assume Eve. knows the state errors.
For simplicity, we consider the following two-block collective errors with coherent states:
Alice wants to use intensity µ = 0.2 for decoy pulses and intensity µ ′ = 0.6 for signal pulses.
However, in some blocks (strengthened blocks), both decoy pulses and signal pulses are 10% stronger than the assumed intensity, in the other blocks (weakened blocks), both decoy pulses and signal pulses are 10% weaker than the assumed values [8] . Suppose Alice always with probabilities of p 0 , p, p ′ to choose one of three different sources (the vacuum source, the decoy source, and the signal source source). The density operator of a coherent state with intensity x is
Here is Eve's scheme using time-dependent channel: she blocks all pulses from the weakened blocks, and she produces a linear channel of transmittance 2η e to attenuate each pulse from the strengthened block. Straightly, the actual counting rate of those single-photon pulses from the decoy source is
× 2η e × 1.1µe
and the actual counting rate of those single-photon pulses from signal source is
We find
Similarly, we can also show that s k = s ′ k for any k. This shows, given the collective error which is known to Eve, Eve can treat the identical k−photon pulses differently according to which source the are from ! The reason behind the above result is because the collective errors may break the "random mixture" condition of Eq. (9) . Consider again the specific example above. Consider those single-photon pulses only. In a strengthened block, a single-photon pulse has probability P s = 1.1pµe
to be from the decoy source; and probability (25) to be from the signal source. In a weakened block, a single-photon pulse has probability
that it comes from the decoy source; and probability
that it comes from the signal source. These values show that the single-photon pulses in the weakened blocks are more probably from the decoy source than those single-photon pulses in the strengthened blocks. Also, the single-photon pulses in the weakened blocks are less probably from the signal source than those single-photon pulses in the strengthened blocks.
These patterns have surely broken the random mixture presumption of Eq.(9).
One may question how Eve. can know the state errors. In the decoy-state plug-andplay protocol [25] , Eve. can actually prepare the error pattern, including the above specific pattern. (Suppose Alice only wants to monitor each pulse but she does not want to cost too much to correct the the error of each individual pulse.)
Even in the one-way protocol, Eve. can also know the intensity errors if Alice does not want to cost too much to correct each individual pulse. Indeed, in the practical set-ups, the intensity fluctuation appears collectively to blocks of pulses. Eve. can know the error patterns by studying the averaged photon number block by block.
In principle, Alice might be able to correct the error of each individual pulses in a real set-up. But, with the theoretical result of this work, Alice does not have to do so. She only needs to know the range of a few parameters of the source.
IV. DECOY-STATE METHOD WITH STATE ERRORS
We still assume that each pulse sent out by Alice is randomly chosen from one of 3 sources 
a ki |k k| ; and (28)
Here ρ i , and ρ ′ i can be a bit different from ρ and ρ ′ of Eq.(1, 2), which are the assumed states in the perfect protocol where there is on source error. At any time i, only one pulse is selected and sent out for Bob, and the probability for a pulse to be selected and sent out is constantly p 0 , p, and p ′ if the pulse is from vacuum source (decoy-source or signal source). The un-selected two pulses at each time will be blocked and absorbed. After Bob has completed all measurements to the incident pulses, Alice checks the record about which pulse is selected at each time, i.e., which time has used which source.
As shown below, based on this virtual protocol, we can formulate the number of counts from each source and therefore find the lower bound of the number of single-photon counts.
The result also holds for the real protocol where Alice decides to use which sources at the ith time in the beginning with the same probability distribution p 0 , p and p ′ . In this case, at each time i, only one source emits a pulse.
B. Our goal
Our goal is to find the lower bound of the fraction of counts caused by those single-photon , the counting rate of the signal source, and
, the counting rate of the vacuum source, are also known exactly in the protocol.
Clearly, here pM, p ′ M and p 0 M are just the number of the decoy pulses, the number of the signal pulses, and the number of pulses from the vacuum source, respectively. Therefore, for our goal, we only need to formulate the number of counts caused by those single-photon pulses from each sources in terms of these quantities and p 0 , p, p ′ and the bound values of those parameters a ki , a ′ ki as appear in Eq.(28,29).
C. Some definitions Definition 1. In the protocol, Alice sends Bob M pulses, one by one. In response to
Alice, Bob observes his detector for M times. As Bob's ith observed result, Bob's detector can either click or not click. If the detector clicks in Bob's ith observation, then we say that "the ith pulse from Alice has caused a count". We disregard how the ith pulse may change after it is sent out. When we say that Alice's ith pulse has caused a count we only need Bob's detector clicks in Bob's ith observation.
Given the source state in Eqs.(28,29), any ith pulse sent out by Alice must be in a photon-number state. To anyone outside Alice's lab, it looks as if that Alice only sends a photon number state at each single-shot: sometimes it's vacuum, sometimes it's a single-photon pulse, sometimes it is a k−photon pulses, and so on. We shall make use of this fact that any individual pulse is in one Fock state.
Definition 2, set C and c k : Set C contains any B-pulse that has caused a count; set c k contains any k−photon B-pulse that has caused a count. Mathematically speaking, the sufficient and necessary condition for i ∈ C is that the ith pulse has caused a count. The sufficient and necessary condition for i ∈ c k is that the ith pulse contains k photons and it has caused a count. For instance, if the photon number states of the first 10 pulses from Alice are |0 , |0 , |1 , |2 , |0 , |1 , |3 , |2 , |1 , |0 , and the pulses of i = 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10 each has caused a count at Bob's side, then we have 
D. Number of vacuum counts
Here we shall give the explicit formulas to bound n 0d , the number of counts caused by those vacuum pulses from the decoy source, and n ′ 0s , the number of counts caused by those vacuum pulses from the signal source. We want to formulate them by the known quantities, such as N 0 , the number of counts by the vacuum source (source Y 0 ), or S 0 , the counting rate of the vacuum source.
Given the definition of the set c k , the number of counts caused by all vacuum pulses is just the number of pulses in set c 0 . We want to know how many of the vacuum counts are caused by each source. This is equivalent to ask how many of pules in set c 0 come from each source. A vacuum pulse can come from any of the 3 sources, the vacuum source (Y 0 ), the decoy source (Y ) and the signal source (Y ′ ). According to Eqs.(28, 29), if the ith pulse is vacuum, the probability that it comes from the vacuum source (Y 0 ) is
Asymptotically, in set c 0 , the population of pulses from source Y 0 is i∈c 0
This is also the number of counts caused by source Y 0 , since every pulse in c 0 has caused a count. Therefore the observed number of counts caused by source Y 0 must satisfy
Here
Similarly, if the ith pulse contains 0 photon, it has a probability P di|0 =
to be from the decoy source, and a probability of
to be from the signal source.
Therefore we have
for the number of counts caused by those vacuum pulses from the decoy source, and
for the number of counts caused by those vacuum pulses from the signal source. Therefore, with our Definition 3, n 0d , n ′ 0s are bounded by
and
Using the fact i∈c 0 d 0i = N 0 p 0 from Eq.(31), we replace the above two equations by
By definition, the counting rate of source Y 0 is S 0 = N 0 p 0 M , therefore the above equations are equivalent to
E. Calculations and main formulas
According to our definition of set C earlier, every pulse in set C has caused a count.
Therefore, the population of the decoy pulses (signal pulses) in set C is just N d (or N s ), the number of counts of the decoy source (signal source). Asymptotically,
and P di|k (or P si|k )is the probability that the ith pulse comes from the decoy source (or signal source); if the ith pulse contains k photons. Here we have used Eqs.(33, 34).
Consider those k-photon pulses (k ≥ 1). A k-photon pulse can come from either the decoy source or the signal source.
Fact : Define
if the ith pulse contains k photons, it has a probability pa ki d ki to be from the decoy source (source Y ), and a probability p ′ a ′ ki d ki to be from the signal source (source
This is to say, P di|k in Eq.(39) and P si|k in Eq.(40)are given by
Therefore, Eqs.(39, 40) can be re-written in the following equivalent form
Our goal as stated in the subsection IV B is simply to know the minimum value of
For, with this and Definition 3, the minimum value of the number of counts caused by single-photon pulses from the signal-source (or the decoy-source) is simply
In what follows we shall find the formula of 
where
According to the definition of Λ and Λ ′ , we also have
Further, we assume the important condition
The first inequality above leads to
as one may easily prove. With Eq.(51), Eq.(49) is equivalent to
Given the Eqs.(48, 55), we can formulate D 1 :
Since ξ 1 , ξ 2 , and ξ 3 are all non-negative, and a 
The bound values of n 0d , n ′ 0d have been given by Eq.(37, 38) in the earlier subsubsection. Therefore, we can now bound the fraction of single counts among all counts caused by the signal source
According to Eq.(47), p ′ a ′L 1 D 1 is the lower bound of the number of counts caused by singlephoton pulses from the signal source. Here we have replaced n 0d in Eq.(57) by its upper bound and n ′ 0s by its lower bound as given in Eq.(37). Using Eq.(38), we can write the right-hand-side of the inequality in terms of counting rates:
is the counting rate of the signal source, S =
is the counting rate of the decoy source, and M is the total number of pulses as defined earlier. Similarly, we also have
for the minimum value of fraction of single-photon counts for the decoy source.
Eqs.(53, 58, 59) and (60) are our main results of this work. The results are based on the virtual protocol where Alice checks which source is used at each time after Bob's detection.
Obviously Alice can choose to check the information before sending out the pulses, i.e., Alice can decide which source to be used at each time in the very beginning. This is then just the real protocol of the decoy-state method. 
with X = L, U and k = 1, 2 and 
V. APPLICATION IN THE PLUG-AND-PLAY PROTOCOL
As shown by Gisin et al [25] , combining with the decoy-state method, the plug-and-play protocol can be unconditionally secure. There, Alice receives strong pulses from Bob and she needs to guarantee the exact intensity of the pulse sending to Bob. It is not difficult to check the intensity, but difficult to precisely correct the intensity of each individual pulses.
Our theory here can help to save the difficult single-shot feed-forward intensity control: Alice monitors each pulses, to reduce the cost of the set-up, she may only do crude corrections to the pulses, or she may simply discard those pulses whose intensity errors are too large (e.g., beyond 2%), and then use our theory with the known bound of state errors. In the Plug-and-Play protocol, Eve. actually knows the error of each individual pulse hence the error-free decoy-state theory based on Eq.(9) fails but our theory here works. 
